USA-Europe: How COVID has accelerated the “right shift” of young people

"Young people have not become conservative out of love for tradition, but out of disillusionment with progress"

Translated from : https://lecourrierdesstrateges.fr/2025/02/19/usa-europe-comment-le-covid-a-accelere-le-virage-a-droite-des-jeunes

The COVID-19 crisis has had a profound impact on Generation Z and millennials, not only in terms of health, but also politically. While young voters were traditionally progressive, recent surveys reveal a significant shift to the right, in the United States as well as in Europe. Between distrust of institutions, withdrawal into identity and immersion in social networks, this trend raises the question: have COVID restrictions sown the seeds of a new youth conservatism?

The popularity of far-right parties has increased sharply. They are beginning to attract the younger generation and this is a global trend. What is driving this shift to the right? There are several factors to consider, such as inflation or weak economic growth. But the Covid-19 pandemic has also played a crucial role. It has apparently reduced young people’s trust in scientific and political authorities.

End of the progressive monopoly among young people

For decades, young Americans have been a Democratic stronghold. In 2008, Barack Obama owed his victory to a landslide victory among 18-29 year-olds. In 2020, Joe Biden still won by 24 points. But in 2024, the situation has changed: Donald Trump has reduced the gap to just 4 points (51% versus 47%), according to a CBS poll. More surprisingly, some surveys even show those under 30 to be more pro-Trump than baby boomers.

This phenomenon extends beyond the American borders. In Europe, the far right is attracting disenchanted youth. In Germany, the AfD (Alternative for Germany) is now the leading party among under-30s. In France, the National Rally is deepening its roots among young people, while in Finland, the True Finns (far right) are achieving historic scores. This global “Rechtsruck” (rightward shift in German) is explained by an explosive cocktail: inflation, the migration crisis, and above all, the political legacy of COVID-19.

Erosion of trust in institutions

The management of the health crisis has severely tested citizens’ trust in their institutions. Young people, particularly impacted by the restrictions, have developed a deep skepticism towards scientific and political authorities. A study by the Systemic Risk Center at the London School of Economics shows that those who experienced a pandemic between the ages of 18 and 25 tend to lose lasting confidence in their leaders. This distrust has fueled a questioning of the progressiveness associated with these institutions.

Last year, journalist Hanne Cokelaere wrote in a Politico article that “far-right parties are on the rise across Europe, and young voters are embracing them.” A 2024 survey of 2,000 people in Germany found that young people had a “dark view” of the future. This explains the surge in popularity of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland among Germans under 30.

In the United States, the Harvard Political Review observed that young voters in 2024 are “more jaded than ever about American leadership.” Their trust in the presidency has fallen by 60% in a decade, and their trust in the Supreme Court or Congress by more than 30%. The chaotic management of the pandemic – between contested restrictions and vaccine inequalities – has exacerbated this skepticism, paving the way for the anti-establishment discourses of the populist right.

COVID at the origin of this global rightward shift

What could be the cause of this global rightward shift? It is difficult to explain it precisely. One could think that it is the result of the protest against inflation. Several countries around the world had to face a considerable and lasting increase in consumer prices last year.

But the most likely cause of this global rightward shift is the Covid-19 pandemic. The confinement has favored an increase in the time spent online, exposing young people to polarizing content. According to the Norwegian researcher Ruben B. Mathisen, social networks have created separate spheres of discussion for men and women, reinforcing an anti-feminist perception among some young men. This phenomenon, coupled with a rise in populist and anti-establishment discourse, has contributed to the rise of right-wing ideologies. “Generation C” (COVID) could sustainably retain the traits acquired during the pandemic: distrust of the state, withdrawal into identity, and adherence to hybrid ideologies mixing scientific skepticism and mysticism.

In Norway, this divide is flagrant: young men massively adhere to anti-immigration parties, carried by a “wave of politicized anti-feminism”. A phenomenon that extends to the West, where boys blame feminist movements (like #MeToo) for having “demonized masculinity”. Masculinist influencers (Andrew Tate, Jordan Peterson) capitalize on this resentment, merging criticism of “wokism” with the promotion of a virile conservatism.

As Anne Applebaum writes in The Atlantic, the new European populist parties today mix anti-vaccination, fascination with esotericism and rejection of immigration.

However, “Generation C” remains marked by a paradox: it criticizes the inaction of governments, but rejects the collective solutions brought by the left.

This tension could define the next political decade. As Derek Thompson summarizes, “young people have not become conservatives out of love for tradition, but out of disillusionment with progress.” It remains to be seen whether this distrust will turn into a new, lasting populism… or into a simple crisis of political adolescence.

By Lalaina Andriamparany