“Some types of food or medicine are more dangerous than viruses or terrorism”

Pr. Martin Zizi, former UN Security Council expert, provides an update on biological weapons. Exclusive interview with Senta Depuydt for Covidhub.

Translated from https://essentiel.news/armes-biologiques/

Since the COVID crisis, the WHO Director General has categorically stated that there will soon be another pandemic, and the prophetic Bill Gates has repeatedly stated that "the next one will be of terrorist origin."

At the UN, too, the issue of terrorists acquiring biological weapons of mass destruction is at the center of debate. With the current geopolitical situation likely to rekindle these fears, to what extent are these threats real?

After conducting an interview with Dr. Heiko Schöning, who believes the pharmaceutical industry and the CIA are preparing the next health emergency that would be of terrorist and bacterial origin, we gathered the reactions of Professor Martin Zizi, a world expert on bioterrorism.

INTERVIEW BY SENTA DEPUYDT FOR COVIDHUB

Senta Depuydt: Professor Martin Zizi, you have had a rather extraordinary career, taking you from Belgium to the United States and all four corners of the world. You have worked in both academic and commercial civilian roles, as well as in military intelligence. Your background has specialized in molecular physiology, biophysics, public health, and bioethics, and you are also the founder of a neurotech company in California. And most importantly, you are also a former expert to the UN Security Council on the issue of biological weapons of destruction. It's a privilege to speak with someone with such experience.

Martin Zizi: Thank you. I'm happy to answer your questions because this is truly a field at the intersection of many expertise, and the topic of biological weapons is one of the hottest topics right now. It's a central theme of many current events, and unfortunately, most people talk about it without knowing anything about it, Bill Gates first and foremost. I advised the Ministry of Defence in Belgium, I worked in various groups within NATO and I was involved for a long time in UNSCOM, the famous commission of the UN Security Council which worked on the issue of weapons of mass destruction, in order to disarm Iraq.

SD : In your opinion, what are the real risks of using biological weapons?

MZ: Before answering your question in detail, we need to understand what we're talking about and what the issues are. Few people know that the first treaty on biological weapons dates back to 1918. After the First World War, during which gas was used in the trenches, scientific institutes of the time, such as Pasteur in France and Robert Koch in Germany, and politicians began to question the possibility of biological weapons. This was mainly due to the fact that many soldiers had become ill due to the poor living and hygiene conditions in the trenches.

So, at the end of the war, the major nations met and discussed the issue. They ended up drafting a two-page agreement in 1925, the Geneva Protocol, banning asphyxiating gases and bacteriological methods. Unfortunately, it never entered into force. It was finally necessary to wait until 1972 for a new Convention on the issue. However, the major problem with this treaty – modeled on similar treaties concerning the control of nuclear and chemical activities – is that it does not provide the means to enforce its application. The work could not be fully completed: for nuclear matters, there was the IAEA; for chemical matters, there was the OPCW, two international control agencies that function, but for biological matters, there are no agencies and there are few possibilities for control.

SD : What are the flaws in this treaty on weapons of mass destruction?

MZ : The various treaties cover CBRN weapons, or Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear weapons. For nuclear weapons, control isn't overly complicated. Developing a nuclear weapon requires an entire infrastructure, and it leaves traces. Radioactive material can be tracked by satellite. With detailed analysis, a sample of fissile material can even identify the reactor that produced it, as it leaves specific fingerprints.

The same goes for chemical weapons. Poison gas, Sarin, VX, Novichok, and others have specific precursors that are used only for that purpose. Therefore, international monitoring of the circulation of these chemical precursors can provide an idea of ​​the intent behind their use. This also leaves residues that are easily identifiable.

However, for the field of biology, and especially molecular biology, it's much more complicated. In biology, everything is 'dual-use'. The same test tubes, the same centrifuges, the same gene probes, chemicals, and restriction enzymes—the same protocols—are used to manufacture drugs and perform medical analyses as to develop biological or genetic weapons. In practice, verifying that no one is developing these types of weapons is therefore much more difficult, if not impossible.

However, experts have developed a protocol called Verex, which consists of verifying whether laboratory activities are carried out properly. I worked for years with the VEREX group. We spent a long time trying to propose a basic text for the implementation of these verification protocols. These involved audits, verifications of import-export lists, or the tagging of certain products. But states always rejected it.

When I joined this work in Geneva in the mid-1990s, after having worked within the US defense research departments (Walter Reed Institute of Research, DARPA), my predecessor for Belgium had clearly explained it to me. As soon as we proposed a text to reach an agreement, it was blocked. Either we were faced with governments hostile to verifications, for example China, or we were blocked by industry. And, in this case, it was mainly the triad, the United States, Western Europe and Japan, that opposed it, because these countries believed that it harmed their industrial dominance and the intellectual property of their innovations. It was therefore a form of clear economic protectionism. In fact, from 1971 to 1998, we spent a lot of money bringing people together in Geneva. They were proud to work for the United Nations Security Council, but in reality, the states lacked the real political will to do anything.

It was with the Iraq War that things really changed. I worked extensively on the Iraqi dossier. I even participated in the final report of the UNSCOM commission, as I was the last "Bioweapon Inspector," but as I said, the negotiations failed. After that, we tried to learn from this failure and contributed to the creation of UNMOVIC.

From that point on, states had to report their military research laboratories and the nature of the projects. My own laboratory was audited every two years; because I worked in both the military and civilian sectors, my work was systematically monitored. So we proposed establishing routine laboratory audits with, in the event of suspicious activity, the possibility of conducting "surprise inspections." There was also a need to train inspection officers, not only in biology and auditing, but also in how to conduct investigations while taking into account the cultural aspects of the country. It's very important to establish a relationship of trust and respect with the local people in this kind of investigation. It's a bit like the work of a shrink, a priest, or a police inspector.

It was Bush Jr. who derailed the whole process. He launched UNMOVIC in Iraq when there were no more weapons of mass destruction, and then concluded that the UN agencies were useless, since they hadn't found anything and that this no longer allowed him to justify the American aggression.

SD : In short, it is almost impossible to verify whether someone is developing a biological weapon of mass destruction?

That's it! There's an additional reason for this. It's Article 10 of the 1972 treaty, because it opens the door to abuse through the role played by businesses. Essentially, the article states that the Convention shall be applied in such a way as to avoid any hindrance to the economic or technical development of States in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins. But, given the industrial vetoes, this was the point of friction between non-aligned states (such as India and Cuba), the BRICS, and the West. This weakened the Convention in favor of commercial interests, each entrenching its positions.

A rather perverse dual phenomenon has taken hold. On the one hand, the pharmaceutical industry and biotechs are doing everything they can to block access to their technology and protect their profits. On the other hand, these industries exploit these lax regulations to conduct their research and test their products surreptitiously in developing countries. Did you know that Gilead first tested Remdesivir in China? When the Chinese found the drug didn't pass the tests, Gilead took it back, saying they would repeat the tests in the West, according to "Good Manufacturing Practices." In this case, we saw that this was more a matter of coloring than the implementation of "good manufacturing practices" rules. And it's the same with many vaccines and drugs that are tested in India or Africa. The absence of rules or their enforcement allows these companies to test potentially dangerous products using unethical or illegal practices, prohibited in Europe or the United States, all for a fraction of the cost. So, with the problem that virtually all research can be dual-use, you can go to Wuhan with funding from Germany, the United States, or France, work for 10 years on a Pfizer project, and then accuse China of engaging in illicit research. That's the problem with Article 10. The company goes there because there's less control and it's cheaper. The Chinese observe and copy the technology, if they don't collaborate directly on the research. And then they're accused of having developed a biological weapon. It's a bit easy, isn't it? Yet, that's the narrative that many politicians and panel experts here in the United States are using. Meanwhile, China has indeed acquired the latest developments in biotechnology for military use. So, the technology transfer that the industry wanted to avoid at all costs, it ended up carrying out under the pretext of budget savings.

SD : Does the biological terrorist weapon theory hold water?

In theory, any biologist has the capacity for mass destruction in their laboratory. Much like any gifted computer scientist can hack the largest systems from a computer in their garage. So yes, the individual is now endowed with a power that was previously reserved for states.

But just because we play with genes doesn't mean we know how to make a weapon. Let's say that developing a weapon in a lab is feasible. But using it, making it operational? ... There are probably fewer than 50 people on this planet capable of doing this. I'm one of them. The key word here is biophysics. For example, a shell filled with plague or anthrax bacteria will never work, because when it explodes, it kills the germs. It's all about the subtle balance between different disciplines: biology, technology and physics.

The proof that it's difficult is that so far all terrorist attempts have failed. For example, the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo—before its two Sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway—released biological agents like anthrax in aerosol form from office towers, but it didn't kill anyone. The same goes for the anthrax letters following September 11. That would kill—without antibiotic treatment—a few people, but no more. About twenty years ago, the Americans produced a report listing all the biological attacks or incidents in the USA during the decade. There were roughly 140, but almost none were fatal. For example, natural anthrax, if you disperse it, well, it kills sheep but not humans because the bacillus is too big for us. There is an occupational risk for knackers or farmers, but that's all. Weaponized anthrax (freeze-dried and treated to remain in the form of isolated particles) is dangerous for the lungs because it penetrates deeply (up to 70%), reaching the alveoli. But it can be treated with simple penicillin or ciprofloxacin, two basic antibiotics. Therefore, it is not fatal. However, it is not surprising that so many people died from SARS-CoV-2 after the pandemic was declared: the virus was allowed to progress to profound sepsis with destruction of the pulmonary alveoli, in the absence of rapid medical treatment.

So the capacity for bioterrorist attacks is quite limited, but it is entirely possible to manufacture biological weapons that are much more subtle than that. Iran has a biological weapons program. They have experimented with toxins from fairly common germs like cholera. We take a cholera gene and clone it into a human microbiome germ, for example Escherichia coli, with which we live in symbiosis. This way, if people get sick, we'll identify the symptoms and look for cholera, but we won't find it. Instead, we'll see E. coli and exclaim, "Horror! Now there are killer E. coli. It's weird, germs mutate." But unless we think about looking for genetic manipulation, we'll think it's natural, because even PCR tests will indicate an E. coli germ. That's an example of a silent biological weapon. Using organisms that are symbiotic with humans, with which they live in harmony, and making them dangerous. And that can cause damage.

That said, I don't think there's a high probability of developing such weapons, because it's something whose origin can still be traced through sequencing. However, if we can prove that a state is developing a biological weapon, politically, it's very serious. It opens the possibility of a response with other equivalent weapons, chemical or nuclear. That's why I'm frightened when people who are poorly informed or misinformed use the term "biological weapons" in the press or in politics, especially if it comes from other scientists. They don't understand the implications it can have.

SD : So, what's the real danger?

MZ : There's a third possibility. This isn't a direct attack on humans, but rather a direct attack on livestock and food. As a specialist, this is what really scares me. Because certain pathogens like wheat rust can wipe out almost 90% of our crops. Let's take the example of rice, which feeds half the planet, and imagine that we breed Terminator-type varieties, like what Monsanto tried with its seeds. Today, we know how to perform a huge amount of manipulation of this type. For example, we can peddle stocks of GMO seeds to everyone and then manufacture a pesticide or other molecule that will activate or repress a gene that will kill or sterilize the plant. And we can spread these effects over time and reap the benefits many times over. So we manage to cause maximum damage, we escape punishment because we operate under the radar, and we line our pockets. Officially, we'll be in a non-militarized situation, but it could very well be a method for killing millions of people. It's Machiavellian, but that's the link between industry and biological weapons. We shouldn't imagine something that will kill people on street corners. That's stupid!

SD : I see you're referring to Covid. Should we fear pandemic viruses, as Bill Gates says?

MZ : No, not at all. Especially since the virus isn't a weapon! I never said that; we have to stop this nonsense. There are real risks and real military developments surrounding this affair, but the danger isn't SARS-CoV-2.

First, it's fairly certain that the natural SARS-CoV-2 virus was already circulating widely around the world in the spring of 2019. We saw it in Brazil, Europe, Thailand, and England through PCR tests carried out on wastewater. I've reread all these papers; they're of very high scientific quality. We've also seen it in certain serological tests on patients, so we have proof that a virus was already circulating everywhere. And alongside that, there was also the gain-of-function research with Ralph Baric and the Wuhan laboratory. One could imagine that they modified the sequence of the natural virus... For now, I don't have proof, but it's possible. The important thing is to understand that during all this time, there were no deaths. Quite simply, because medical services were functioning. It only started when the pandemic was declared and people were banned from being treated. It's like with the flu: patients who develop sepsis must be treated. I say it clearly: "People didn't die from a virus, but from a political decision."

Furthermore, generally speaking, there's no reason to fear a viral pandemic. Either we're dealing with a truly dangerous pathogen, but it kills its hosts immediately and doesn't spread easily. Or we're in the opposite situation, where there's a highly contagious but relatively benign agent. All epidemiologists know this. So, by definition, the virus is a poor weapon.

SD : And the vaccine?

MZ : If the virus isn't a weapon, the vaccine "behaves like" one. What's really dangerous about this vaccine today is the messenger RNA platform. This RNA technology has some useful uses. For example, in certain cancers like melanoma, we use precision molecular biology, targeting the patient's tumor. We can also perform such precise cell targeting through in vivo electroporation. It works well, but here we inject RNA into the muscle. It's not an immune cell; it's not immunocompetent. It won't give orders to white blood cells to attack cells. On the other hand, it creates an accelerated autoimmune attack due to the production of viral proteins that are found on the membrane of muscle cells and exposed to white blood cells.

We see the consequences with vaccine-induced myocarditis. It's not like viral myocarditis, where we generally get through it quite well because it's just inflammation. Myocarditis following the vaccine is autoimmune and therefore chronic, and will be lifelong. The more we use the heart muscle, the more we'll be in danger. We've seen this in athletes. And the prognosis after 10 years is one-third transplant recipients and one-third deaths... With a risk that increases 10 or even 20 times depending on age and sex, it's unacceptable. For drugs, as soon as the risk doubles, they are withdrawn from the market.

We absolutely must stop this RNA platform. Not just in vaccines, but in all the other formulations we prepare. Because it's a technology we can't control, and we'll see the same side effects recur. Today, that's kind of my fight.